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Most academic literature relating to Olympic sponsorship and sponsor 
media suggests that while sponsors have a stake in their association with the 
event itself, it can be more efficient to associate themselves with the host 
destination (Brown 2000a, 2000b; Chalip 2000b, 2004; O’Brien 2006; 
O’Reilly, Heslop, and Nadeau 2011). However, sponsors’ domination of the 
Olympic Brand can limit the opportunities of other stakeholders and 
businesses to capitalise on the event. Unlike smaller-scale sport events, 
where sponsorship-related marketing activities are less controlled, Olympic 
sponsorship has over the last few decades witnessed a growing complexity 
in protecting sponsors’ rights and their monopoly of association with the 
event and its host destination. This chapter explores some of the key issues 
related to Olympic sponsorship with examples provided from the London 
2012 Olympic Games. The first section of this chapter focuses on the  
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protection of the Olympic brand by the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) and the London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games 
(LOCOG). The second section outlines some examples of strategies used by 
sponsors to monopolise their use of the Olympic brand and restrict 
associations made with the event and destination by other stakeholders.  
This chapter is part of a broader qualitative empirical research project 
undertaken at Bournemouth University in the UK. The research explored 
multi-stakeholders’ perspectives of leveraging the London 2012 Olympic 
Games for long term outcomes and the limitations of such leverage. The 
study was underpinned by an interpretivist mode of enquiry (Guba and 
Lincoln 2005) to understand the context of a phenomenon that is still an 
under-researched area. For this purpose, the authors applied purposeful 
sampling as a dominant strategy (Flick 2009; Walliman 2011). The lead 
researcher conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with key informants 
who represented organisations that were stakeholders in the London 2012 
Olympic Games. All informants held managerial or organisational roles 
related to the 2012 Games. The majority of the findings for this chapter came 
from 8 of the 20 interviews, with informants from VisitBritain, UK Trade 
and Investment, London and Partners, Tourism Alliance, the Olympic 
Research Centre, 2012 Team South-West, the London Business Network, 
and EDF Energy. 
Overall, interviews lasted up to 90 minutes. Once all data were collected, 
the authors engaged in a thematic analysis process. Data were organised and 
broken down into manageable units and then synthesised (Spencer, Ritchie, 
and O’Conner 2003). NVivo 10 was used to assist the steps of analysis in 
indexing and coding (Walch 2003; Bazeley 2007). For this chapter, 
stakeholders’ perspectives were critically discussed and augmented by 
previous academic literature with an immersion of both examples discussed 
with those stakeholder-informants and the reflections of the authors. Two 
tables are provided as summaries of key issues and examples explored in 
this chapter.  
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OLYMPIC BRAND PROTECTION BY IOC, LOCOG  
AND THE SPONSORS 
 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) became a multi-billion 
dollar international corporation after being an amateur-run Olympic 
Organisation (Séguin and O’Reilly 2008). This transformation was 
grounded on the partnership between the IOC and Olympic sponsors, where 
the vital component of this partnership is that the IOC offers every sponsor 
exclusive category rights (O’Reilly, Heslop, and Nadeau 2011). The IOC 
instructed local organising committees to support sponsors’ rights, which 
resulted in the foundation of a business-to-business relationship between 
Olympic sponsors, the rights-holder (IOC), and the local organising 
committees (O’Reilly, Heslop, and Nadeau 2011). More than operating 
sports, and in order to protect and maximise the return on investment for its 
partners, the IOC became obliged to adopt business principles via, for 
instance, strategic brand management (Bodet 2013). With this in mind, an 
issue with the London 2012 Olympic Games was that the IOC restricted the 
use of certain words or phrases to protect sponsors who had paid to associate 
their products with the Games. It became almost impossible for various 
stakeholders, small businesses and some suppliers of the event to be 
involved (see Table 4-1). Keeping this in mind, Farrelly et al. (2006, 344) 
referred to the IOC as a “property” who agrees to take the “lion’s share of 
responsibility” to protect the use of the Olympic brand by only its sponsors. 
The IOC provided a guideline on how the Olympic branding should be used 
within the event media to prevent any ambush marketing.  
Although some other organisations had a stake in the hosting of the 
London 2012 Olympic Games, the brand protection guidelines provided by 
the IOC made it difficult for those UK stakeholders to showcase what they 
had to offer. The London 2012 Olympic Games were considered as a catalyst 
for showcasing the country worldwide for various outcomes including 
economic, socio-cultural and environmental outcomes (Jakobsen et al. 
2013), but the association with the Games was limited to sponsors. 
Companies that were suppliers of goods or services to the Games, but that 
were not official sponsors, were limited to only referring to their 
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involvement with the Games as part of a broad list of projects they were 
working on and could not explicitly advertise their London 2012 related 
work (discussed by UK Trade and Investment informant). Official sponsors 
had protocol agreements with their legal teams to alert competitors if their 
promotion could be contravening ambush marketing rules (BBC 2008). EDF 
Energy, for instance, worked with the Organising Committee (LOCOG) to 
write to competitors of the major supplier partners to warn against ambush 
marketing and to remind them of their obligations and the relevant rules 
(EDF informant). In practice, sponsors were proactive and ready to react to 
anything extreme from a competitor (see Table 4-1). Louw (2012) referred 
to such methods as tactics in which the law has been abused to protect the 
private commercial gains of mega-events’ sponsors at the expense of the 
rights of everyone else. Indeed, EDF could defend the right of the company 
by emphasising the “good job” they were doing for the Games to other major 
partners and suppliers who might have attempted to use ambush marketing 
(EDF informant added). However, as the “good job” they did with the use 
of the London 2012 brand bought the legitimacy as a sponsor, other non-
sponsor suppliers, competitors or stakeholders involved with the Games 
could claim legitimacy by referring to their “good job” as well. Here, three 
interesting questions could be asked. First, why were non-sponsor 
stakeholders not allowed to do so, assuming the good job they did for the 
Games gave them a similar claim to legitimacy? Second, why could only 
sponsors use the law to protect their commercial gains? Third, are those non-
sponsor suppliers, competitors or stakeholders really ambushing what 
sponsors do? 
One example was British Gas, which had sponsored British swimming 
but not the Olympics (see Table 4-1). As this associated British Gas with an 
“Olympic” sport, while they were allowed to use this association in the run 
up to the London 2012 Olympics, they were prevented from doing so during 
the period of the Olympic Games (discussed by EDF informant). 
Another example was GDF Suez, which had a contract to build an energy 
plant on the Olympic Park (GDF Suez 2013). The Olympic Delivery 
Authority (ODA) held a press conference during which GDF’s work at the 
Olympic Park was mentioned. This was observed by EDF as crossing the 
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line into being ambush marketing as opposed to legitimate promotional 
activity (argued by EDF informant). In both of these examples, it is notable 
that the companies involved were direct competitors for EDF in the UK 
energy market. 
 
Table 4-1. Protecting Sponsors’ Rights – Example Summary:  
EDF Energy vs Competitors 
 
Strategy Tactic Challenges Examples 
Protecting 
Olympic 
Brand  
Brand 
protection 
guidelines 
Only sponsors 
could associate 
themselves 
with the Games 
IOC’s and LOCOG’s restrictions 
on the use of Olympic branding  
Companies that won contracts 
(non-sponsors) to supply the 
Games could not mention their 
supply work to the Olympic 
Games 
Sponsors’ 
legal 
teams 
Other 
companies 
were warned 
about ambush 
marketing, even 
the suppliers 
EDF (London 2012 sponsor) 
EDF’s legal team warned 
competitors through LOCOG 
about marketing and advertising 
rules 
EDF’s “good job” with the Games 
gave them the right to buy the 
association with the Games and 
event logo and to use all the 
advantages 
British Gas (non-Olympic 
sponsor: sponsor of British 
swimming)  
Association with British 
swimming  
that was forced to stop as it is an 
Olympic sport 
GDF Suez (Supplier but non-
sponsor: contractor to build an 
energy plant for the Olympic 
Park) 
GDF’s and ODA’s press 
conference mentioning the work 
was considered as ambush 
marketing by EDF 
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The business-to-business associations built through the control of IOC, 
LOCOG and sponsors are where images that customers hold can be 
transferred through that association which can positively impact the sponsor, 
the Games organiser and the host city (Gwinner and Eaton 1999; O’Reilly, 
Heslop, and Nadeau 2011). Previous literature on event leveraging (e.g., 
Chalip 2000b, 2004; O’Brien 2006, 2007) showed other benefits (e.g., 
tourism and business) of the association for the host city or destination 
through sponsors’ marketing alliances with destination marketing 
organisations. Nevertheless, one can argue that examples from the London 
2012 Olympic Games may question previous literature in terms of the 
“marketing alliance”. While sponsors are highly protected by the IOC, 
LOCOG and their legal teams, they create their own marketing agenda. 
Other salient stakeholders can still claim legitimacy based on the “good job” 
they did, but struggled to capitalise on the Olympic Games to promote 
themselves. In the light of this section, the next section discusses how the 
monopoly of sponsors has had a negative impact on both the tourism and 
business legacy of the London 2012 Olympics from various stakeholders’ 
perspectives.  
 
 
SPONSORS’ MONOPOLY: IMPACTS ON  
NON-SPONSOR STAKEHOLDERS 
 
The result of the IOC’s and LOCOG’s regulations with London 2012 to 
protect sponsors from ambush marketing was that sponsors monopolised the 
Olympic brand and logo. Opportunities for other stakeholders became 
limited to capitalise on the fact that the country was hosting the Olympic 
Games. Tourism and business stakeholders in particular wanted to showcase 
the whole of the country for long-term tourism and business benefits. Indeed, 
some stakeholders such as VisitBritain attempted to adopt an approach of a 
marketing alliance, as suggested in previous literature (e.g., Brown 2000a, 
2000b; Chalip 2000a, 2000b, 2004; O’Brien 2006, 2007), where the impact 
can be on sponsors, event organisers and the host city and country (see 
Gwinner and Eaton 1999; O’Reilly, Heslop, and Nadeau 2011).  
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However, London 2012 sponsors adopted their own advertising and 
reporting agenda for their own commercial gains forcing their conditions on 
marketing allies when they overlapped with, or clashed with, other 
stakeholders’ marketing (see Table 4-2). British Airways (a sponsor) and 
VisitBritain (not a sponsor) had strategic co-branding activities based on a 
“win-win” situation (example provided by VisitBritain informant). Other 
stakeholders expressed their concerns about the impact of sponsors’ 
monopolies on showcasing the country for tourism and business. In terms of 
marketing, the idea that sponsors used the Olympics as an opportunity to 
exclusively market their own products is a problematic concept because the 
Olympics were not funded solely by private sponsorship, but also by 
taxpayers’ money (argued by an Olympic Research Centre informant), and 
the use of public funds in a way that provides private companies with 
monopolies is very questionable. An additional example was added by an 
Olympic Research Centre informant: the purchase of tickets to Olympic 
events could only be made through one payment method (a Visa card, see 
Table 4-2).  
Furthermore, the monopoly of advertising was observed not only in 
relation with the London 2012 event per se, but also during the Torch Relay 
(see Table 4-2), an example observed by the 2012 Team South-West 
informant. This observation supports the view that the commercial benefits 
from advertising were limited to Olympic sponsors. No one could advertise 
in association with the Torch Relay except for sponsors, once the torch was 
coming past Stonehenge or other attractions, Coca-Cola started setting up 
the billboards along the route, saying for instance “Coca-Cola: sponsor of 
the Torch Relay…or sponsor of the Torch for the Games…or London 2012” 
(informant quoted). Obviously small businesses along the torch route were 
not allowed to get involved. 
This view that small businesses were not able to associate themselves 
with the Games and the Torch Relay was echoed by the Tourism Alliance 
informant; for instance, a pub owner along the way could not mention a 
Sunday lunch and invite people to watch the torch go past the pub because 
this means getting a commercial gain (see Table 4-2). All examples provided 
above raise a serious concern of how small businesses could gain benefit 
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from being associated with the Games, Torch Relay and/or other aspects 
related to the Olympic Games without taking away from them as they are 
actually paying the large amounts of money to put it on in the first place as 
tax payers. That was one of the issues that the Tourism Alliance had a long 
series of debates with LOCOG on allowing small businesses to advertise 
(Tourism Alliance informant added). In this case, stakeholders who aimed 
to showcase the whole of the country for tourism and business opportunities 
were prevented from doing so. While the Torch Relay route covered the 
whole of the country, not allowing small businesses and tourism attraction 
operators to capitalise on the fact that the torch was passing their doorstep 
prevented them from showcasing their destination (questioned by both Team 
South-West and Tourism Alliance informants).  
Unsurprisingly, it was not only small businesses who struggled with the 
restrictions on advertising and marketing, but also major stakeholders such 
as London and Partners who had to showcase London for tourism and 
business as part of their role (see Table 4-2). With London being the host 
city of the Olympic Games, even London and Partners was restricted in what 
the organisation could do in its marketing. It had no rights to use the Olympic 
logos or anything else related to the Games. Therefore, as an industry and 
salient stakeholder that wanted to promote packages to London around the 
Games, it was impossible to work with hotels, tourist attractions and other 
stakeholders due to the severely limited ability to promote the destination’s 
attractions and advertise the fact that London was going to host the Games. 
Only LOCOG could do that with the sponsors (argued by London and 
Partners informant).  
This supports examples discussed above and indicates a lack of 
coordination between sponsors of London 2012 and destination marketers, 
as well as the role that LOCOG played in limiting opportunities for 
stakeholders to collaborate with sponsors. Sponsors associated themselves 
with the Olympic brand to market their products, while at the same time 
London and Partners and other stakeholders could not promote the host 
city/country using the Games. Sponsors such as EDF went further and 
bought the rights to associate themselves with tourism attractions (see Table 
4-2). As a sponsor, they were flexible with respect to the ways in which they 
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associated themselves with different aspects of the Games and controlled 
advertising using London’s tourism attractions, thus limiting London and 
Partners’ promotion possibilities. In support of the above concern by the 
London and Partners informant, an example was outlined by the EDF 
sponsorship informant showing how the sponsor used London’s attractions 
to advertise its products. As a global energy leader, and by associating itself 
with the Games, this sponsor wanted people to understand that the electricity 
they produced was low-carbon. The sponsor built a strategy that was based 
on people who came to London during the Olympic Games, clearly if they 
had tickets they were attending their events, but while they were in London 
most tourists would visit one or more of London’s attractions, many of 
which are located on the banks of the River Thames. EDF’s outdoor and 
posters advertising strategy was described in grandiose terms as “owning the 
river”. This strategy involved strategic positioning on the main railway 
stations that were interchange stations for tourists on the way to the Olympic 
Park and/or tourism attractions in London. EDF bought in media auctions of 
the advertising at Waterloo Station, had a very dominant position at 
Westminster Station and focused particularly on the “EDF Energy London 
Eye”. Furthermore, EDF marketers used a branded EDF boat to conduct 
river tours and had advertising deals with other attractions on the river and 
had displays inside and on the exterior glass of City Hall, also right by the 
river (outlined by EDF informant). 
This indicates the control of EDF on London’s major tourism 
attractions. This meant that destination marketers such as London and 
Partners were under the dominance of sponsors such as EDF. The EDF 
informant’s examples above explain the dominance strategy that was built 
on the consumers’ need for low-cost energy. Therefore, a critical look at the 
examples above shows that EDF was associating with the sustainability 
aspect of the Olympic Games as well. EDF targeted UK and international 
Olympic tourists via the existence of its advertising in the major locations 
around London. However, whilst this sponsor referred to its strategy as 
“owning the river”, it was also associating itself with the attractions in 
London by using this marketing technique. EDF did not only use the London 
2012 branding, but also used London attractions for private commercial 
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gains instead of having a marketing alliance with London and Partners. This 
made it almost impossible for destination marketing stakeholders in London 
to capitalise on the Olympic Games. 
It was not only in London that this occurred. Similar examples were 
observed in Weymouth and Portland (the host of the sailing events). UKTI 
as a stakeholder was promoting the UK for businesses. However, for 
Weymouth and Portland, UKTI organised a Business Pavilion and 
hospitality programmes to showcase the region for business activities and to 
encourage future business relationships. As a non-sponsor stakeholder of the 
Olympic Games, banks such as HSBC or Barclays could not support a 
business meeting or any hospitality programme because LOCOG was 
arranging all sponsorship activities through Lloyds Bank as it was one of the 
London 2012 sponsors (see Table 4-2). Such restriction in this example goes 
beyond sponsoring the Games and using the Olympic brand. Only Lloyds as 
the principal banking sponsor of LOCOG could support non-sponsors’ and 
other stakeholders’ hospitality programmes; which means in addition to 
sponsors’ private corporate hospitality programmes where they showcase 
their products, they were using opportunities from non-sponsor 
stakeholders’ hospitality programmes that attempted to showcase the 
country for businesses for example (outlined by UKTI informant). 
Furthermore, sponsorship associations can be made with positive 
aspects of the Olympic Games that counter negative stories related to a 
sponsor’s businesses. BP’s sponsorship, for instance, was discussed by the 
London Business Network informant. BP had committed to sponsor the 
London 2012 Games before the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010, but then used the sustainability and environmental aspects 
of the Games to associate its brand and advertising alongside a very green 
and environmentally friendly focus (see Table 4-2). Deloitte, an accounting 
and consulting firm, was one of the main sponsors of the Games. Deloitte 
committed to give exclusive consultancy activities associated with their 
sponsorship to LOCOG, ODA, and to all the organisations involved in 
running the event. It was echoed by the London Business Network informant 
that this was an area where LOCOG and the other organisations had a need 
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and thus Deloitte stepped into it and provided the service as part of their 
sponsorship, but also exclusively benefited from the association. 
While some of EDF’s sponsorship raised the profile of the company by 
association with tourism attractions along the River Thames, the main 
strategy they employed was “helping the Games shine brighter” (discussed 
by the EDF informant). By providing the electricity services for the Games 
such as the timing equipment and buzzers that are crucial in many sports, as 
well as lighting and all other electrical equipment, the message that EDF was 
trying to get across was that their expertise at providing electrical products 
and supplying electricity was on a par with the elite performance 
demonstrated by Olympic athletes. As a result, the brand awareness of EDF 
in the UK dramatically increased between 2008 and 2012. The Games gave 
EDF an exclusive platform for engaging with key UK stakeholders and 
customers by demonstrating EDF’s capacity to innovate and their high levels 
of expertise in managing energy consumption. As a mega sport event, EDF’s 
exclusive use of the London 2012 brand helped in broadening potential 
consumers’ understanding and awareness of the scope of EDF’s activity 
beyond France and the UK. EDF now have international bases and activities 
in China and other European countries for example (added by the 
informant). 
This section has shown that some of the stakeholders in the London 2012 
Games raised some concerns over sponsorship of the Games. There were 
concerns that the joint private and public funding of the Games led to 
taxpayers’ money being spent on activities that provided private companies 
with monopolies over aspects of the Games’ organisation and marketing. 
There were concerns that the wider economic benefits of hosting the 
Olympics are constrained because any company that is not an official 
sponsor is unable to take advantage of marketing opportunities, and 
therefore that the benefits of the Games cannot be leveraged. There were 
concerns that sponsors were able to dominate local attraction and tourism 
branding to the possible detriment of other local attractions; and there were 
concerns that the sponsors’ need to associate themselves with particular 
aspects of the Games was to the detriment of other wider impacts of the 
Games.  
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Table 4-2. Sponsor Monopoly and Challenges for  
Non-Sponsor Stakeholders 
 
Sponsor 
Control 
Tactic Challenges Examples 
Sponsor 
monopoly of  
advertising 
and 
marketing 
Sponsors’ 
extensive 
focus on 
marketing 
their product 
to control 
various 
aspects related 
to the 
Olympic 
Games 
Public 
investment/ 
taxpayers’ 
money 
facilitating the 
sponsors’ 
monopoly 
Monopoly on purchasing of Olympic 
tickets (Visa): controlling public 
investment by using taxpayers’ 
money which does not necessarily 
result in benefiting wider society 
SMEs, salient 
stakeholders 
and 
destination 
marketers 
prevented 
from 
marketing 
Small businesses along the Torch 
Relay route could not market in 
relation with it because they would be 
getting commercial benefits 
Destination marketing organisations 
such as London and Partners could 
not promote packages to London 
around the Games through their 
advertisements 
UKTI could not invite banks other 
than Lloyds to their hospitality 
programmes when they are 
showcasing the UK for business 
Sponsors 
owned, or 
branded, 
tourism 
attractions 
EDF association with London (“own 
the river” strategy) 
Exclusive media auctions and 
dominant promotion positions at 
railway stations and on local public 
transport near tourism attractions  
Giving a name to London Eye (EDF 
Energy London Eye) 
EDF branded river cruise along the 
River Thames 
Attractions could not use the event in 
their marketing unless they were 
sponsored by EDF 
Sponsors’ 
associations 
with 
aspects/needs 
of the Games  
BP: association with sustainability 
and environment aspect to shift 
negative perceptions of their disaster 
in the Mexican Gulf 
Deloitte: association with consultancy 
needed by ODA and LOCOG 
EDF: “helping the Games shine 
brighter” 
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As a result of the sponsors’ domination of various aspects of the 
Olympic Games, their products, services and brand awareness can shift 
positively in the domestic and international market. However, the 
justification for sponsors’ involvement was the need of LOCOG to run and 
improve the Games through their services. Without the sponsors, the Games 
would need even more public funding, and might be prohibitively expensive. 
The Games became subject to sponsors’ guidance in an “ethopolitics” 
process (see Bulley and Lisle 2012, 2014). Bulley and Lisle (2012, 2014) 
discussed McDonalds’s similar situations with the London 2012 
sponsorship; while the volunteers did a good job in welcoming London 2012 
visitors, their training process was functioned through “ethopolitics” 
because their behaviours and values were influenced and directed by a 
commercial company that looks for commercial benefits. Indeed, the 
approaches of sponsorship dominance discussed in this chapter combine the 
dominant commercial force of sponsors in line with Bulley and Lisle’s 
(2012, 2014) terminology. EDF owned the Games by using strategic 
locations such as train stations and “owning the river” including London’s 
attractions by “helping the Games shine brighter”. BP adopted its London 
2012 strategy to counter negative perceptions from an environmental 
disaster in another part of the world, shifting perceptions by associating with 
the “green” services the company was providing for the Games.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The current chapter has highlighted a number of issues regarding the 
relationship between the IOC, LOCOG and the London 2012 sponsors to 
protect sponsorship rights. Perhaps the key issue is that the exclusive 
business-to-business approach adopted by the IOC and Olympic sponsors 
changes the nature of the Games and its benefits. From the discussion in this 
chapter, it is clear that sponsors were building their brand awareness in the 
UK and international markets. This chapter supports the idea that sponsors 
became the controller of various aspects of the Olympic Games where their 
focus is merely on their own private commercial gain. This position refutes 
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previous literature on leveraging sport events (see Brown 2000a, 2000b; 
Chalip 2000b, 2004; O’Brien 2006, 2007), where they all suggest forming a 
marketing alliance with destination marketers to generate mutual benefits. 
Non-sponsor stakeholders interviewed for this chapter argued that London 
2012 sponsors were not considering mutual leverage of benefits with 
destination marketing organisations and other businesses. The data shows 
that the sponsors’ focus on leveraging their private commercial gain by 
having a monopoly over all the various aspects around the Olympics left 
other stakeholders with limited options for their marketing and media 
campaigns. Overall, non-sponsor stakeholders consider this situation as a 
“problematic” one, particularly given that the organisation of the Olympic 
Games involves taxpayers’ money which in turn was used to facilitate 
sponsors’ monopoly of the event. 
While much of the justification for hosting large, or mega-events is often 
that while the event organisers may not be able to make a profit from running 
the event, and need public subsidy, the wider economic benefits from 
hosting such events tend to greatly outweigh the cost to the event organisers. 
The IOC’s funding model attempts to capture part of the wider economic 
benefits through sponsorship funding, and hence counter arguments that 
criticise the public cost of staging such events. The concerns raised by 
stakeholders in this chapter imply that it is possible to take this funding 
model too far, and that sponsorship regulations restrict the wider economic 
benefits that mega-events bring. 
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